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SOVEREIGNTY AND NATURAL RESOURCES-A STUDY OF
CANADIAN PETROLEUM LEGISLATION*
A. R. THOMPSONI
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Exploitation of natural resources is a major preoccupation of governments. Industrial nations seek to ensure a full flow of raw materials; newly developing nations seek to provide the underpinnings of an
industrial economy. In the United Nations, symposiums have focused
attention on resource development.'
These studies have sought to place
the exercise of sovereignty over resources in proper perspective to foster
a balance of interests between the developer and the country whose resources are exploited.2 In balancing these interests, sovereignty and security of tenure are opposite sides of the scale. In the name of "sovereignty,"' a country claims to control resource development as the national
interest may dictate from time to time; in the name of "security of tenure," developers claim to exercise their acquired rights unimpeded and
undiminished.
Petroleum usually is singled out for special legislative treatment. It
is said that "[P]etroleum is often the subject of newer special legislation,
partly because of the growing size and importance of the petroleum industry as a primary source of energy and partly because of the problems
of exploration and production, as distinguished from the conduct of similar activities under a general mining law." 4 Probably, the need for special legislation is generated as much by the social and political consequences of the exploitation of petroleum as it is by the complicated technology of the industry. In petroleum mining, more than in other mineral
* Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University.
t Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta, Canada.
1. Mineral Resources Development Series, ECAFE annual symposiums.
2. The Status of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources, U.N.
SECRETARIAT, (A/AC, 97/5/Rev. 2; E/3511; A/AC 97/13), (1962).
In the United Nations, the right of sovereignty over natural resources has gained recognition in the U.N.
Resolution of December 14, 1962. For an analysis of this right, see MUGHRABY, PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER OIL RESOURCES (Lebanon, 1966).
3. The term "sovereignty" is not used in its public international law sense, but, as
Mughraby says: "[T]he target of permanent sovereignty is the private international
corporation." MUGHRABY, supra note 2, at 39. The term is here used in this wider
sense as connoting the aspiration of a people or nation to economic independence as well
as to political independence.
4. Ely, Summary of Mining and Petroleum Laws of the World, U.S. BUREAU OF
MINES, INFORMATION CIRCULAR 8017, at 4 (1961).
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extraction activities, operations range over extensive land surface areas,
especially during the exploration stage. Even in the stage of final development land is used extensively for wells, storage batteries, pipelines,
processing plants and refineries. 5 In settled areas this land use affects
day-to-day living, enhancing the social and political impact of resource
development. 6 Almost by definition, the exploitation of petroleum is carried on by foreigners in newly-developing countries.'
In consequence,
legislators must digest the reality of foreign exploitation of an economically vital resource under conditions necessitating widespread technical
operations particularly disturbing to local communities. It is not surprising, then, that issues of sovereignty intrude.
Canada has not escaped from a concern over the issue of sovereignty
with respect to resource development. At the provincial level, rural antagonism to the taking and use of land for well-sites and pipelines by large
oil companies has been provoked in the name, among other epithets, of
"foreign exploitation."'
In federal politics, Canadians increasingly debate the question whether it is in the national interest that foreigncontrolled corporations should dominate the the resource extraction
industries.'
The purpose of this study is to examine the means which governments in Canada have used to achieve a balance between the competing
claims of sovereignty and of security of tenure in dealing with petroleum
5.

This intense involvement in land relationships is further examined in Thompson,
CANADIAN LEGAL STUDIES 152 (1966).
6. At the "grass-roots" level, granger-type movements have been common in North
America with respect to petroleum exploitation. Alberta has a "Mineral Rights' Protective Association" which has sought to organize farmers and ranchers to secure a
better deal from the oil companies.
7. "There are in fact virtually no examples of petroleum exploration operations
not financed by risk capital." See Petroleum Exploration: Capital Requirements and
Methods of Financing, U.N. DEP'T OF EcoNOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS 15 (1962).
8. Mineral Rights Protective Association, see note 6 supra.
9. In 1961, non residents controlled 69% of the value of investment in petroleum
and natural gas, 59% in mining and smelting, and 59% in manufacturing. The Honorable Walter L. Gordon, former Minister of Finance, is the leading spokesman for the
introduction of nationalistic policies with respect to investment. See GORDON, A CHOICE
FOR CANADA 81, 82 (1966) in which the author singles out the petroleum industry for
attack.
Many of our more important industries are now dominated by companies that
are controlled by foreign-parent corporations. One of these is the petroleum
industry which pays very little tax compared with other industries; it benefits
from depletion allowances as well as capital-cost allowances; and the integrated oil companies may offset their development and exploration expenditures
against profits earned on distribution. It follows that the larger oil companies
are in a position to generate from retained earnings a substantial proportion of
the capital they require for further expansion. It is somewhat ironic to think
that Canadian motorists and other consumers of petroleum products and
Canadian taxpayers are in this way providing the capital for the rapid expansion of an industry which, in large measure, is controlled by foreigners.

A Perspective on Petroleum Lazy, 1
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exploration and development. For the most part, Canadian petroleum
reserves are owned by the various provinces and territories of the country. It is in the agreements and legislation of these regions that the
In
rules governing the disposition of petroleum rights will be found.'
this paper, however, only the essentially "legal" aspect of the question
will be considered, leaving aside the international trade relations and the
fiscal, revenue and taxation measures which operate as incentives or deterrents to foreign participation in the petroleum industry. Only representative agreements and legislation will be dealt with, those of Alberta,
the leading petroleum producer, being principally treated.
THE RECORD IN OTHER COUNTRIES

The dimensions of the Canadian situation can be indicated by reviewing the attempts in other countries to resolve the conflict between sovereignty and security of tenure with respect to petroleum development."
Diversity is the most notable characteristic of these attempts. At
one extreme are the concession agreements of the Middle East and of
some African countries containing provisions for stabilizing the applicable law in favor of acquired rights, and for settlement of disputes between the developer and the host country by arbitration." The impartiality of the proceedings is ensured by stipulating that a person such as
the President of the International Court of Justice will appoint the memAt the other extreme are Latin Ameribers to the arbitration tribunal.'
10. For a general statement of the historical background of petroleum legislation in
Canada, see Thompson, Petroleum Land Policies Contrasted, 36 U. COLO. L. REv. 187
(1964).
11. This record is provided in great detail in the United Nations publication cited
in note 2 supra.
12. E.g., Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Liberia, and Saudi Arabia.
13. Algeria: Evian Agreements of August 28, 1962-Principles of Cooperation for
the Development of Sahara's Underground Resources, Section IV:Arbitration
Regardless of any provision to the contrary, any dispute or controversy
between the public authority and the holders of the rights guaranteed under
Section IA above shall be submitted, in both the first and last instances, to an
international arbitration court, in accordance with the following principles:
Each party shall designate an arbitrator, and the two arbitrators shall appoint a third arbitrator, who shall be the chief of the arbitration court; in
case of failure to agree on such an appointment, the President of the International Court of Justice shall be asked to make said appointment upon the request of either party;
The court shall render its awards by majority vote;
Recourse to court shall operate as a stay of proceedings;
The court's award shall be binding, without "exequatur," over the territory
of the country the parties belong to, and shall be considered fully enforceable
outside of said territories, 3 days after the delivery of said award.
Libya: Royal Decree Law of November 20, 1965, Amending Certain Provisions of the
Petroleum Law, 1955, Article X-Clause 28 of Schedule II to the Petroleum Law No.
25 of 1955, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
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can laws which, by the Calvo Clause, purport to impose the local regime
and local courts on the foreign concessionaire without recourse to diplo(1) If at any time during or after the currency of this Concession any
difference or dispute shall arise between the Government and the Company
concerning the interpretation or performance hereof, or anything herein contained or in connection herewith, or the rights and liabilities of either of such
parties hereunder and if such parties should fail to settle such difference or
dispute by agreement, the same shall, failing any agreement to settle it any
other way, be referred to two Arbitrators, one of whom shall be appointed by
each such party, and an Umpire who shall be appointed by the Arbitrators
immediately after they are themselves appointed.
In the even of the Arbitrators failing to agree upon an Umpire within
60 days from the date of the appointment of the second Arbitrator, either of
such parties may request the President or, if the President is a national of
Libya or of the Country where the Company was incorporated, the VicePresident, of the International Court of Justice to appoint the Umpire.
(2)
The institution of Arbitration proceedings shall take place upon the
receipt by one of such parties of a written request for Arbitration from the
other which request shall specify the matter in respect of which Arbitration is
required and name the Arbitrator appointed by the party requiring Arbitration.
(3)
The party receiving the request shall within 90 days of such receipt
appoint its Arbitrator and notify this appointment to the other of such parties
failing which such other party may request the President or, in the case referred to in paragraph (1) above, the Vice-President, of the International
Court of Justice to appoint a Sole Arbitrator and the decision of a Sole Arbitrator so appointed shall be binding upon both such parties.
(4) If the Arbitrators appointed by such parties fail to agree upon a decision within 6 months of the institution of Arbitration proceedings or any such
Arbitrator becomes unable or unwilling to perform his functions at any time
within such period, the Umpire shall then enter upon the Arbitration. The
decision of the Arbitrators, or in case of a difference of opinion between them,
the decision of the Umpire, shall be final. If the Umpire or the Sole Arbitrator,
as the case may be, is unable or unwilling to enter upon or complete the Arbitration, then, unless such parties otherwise agree, a substitute will be appointed
at the request of either such party by the President or, in the case referred to
in paragraph (1) above, the Vice-President, of the International Court of Justice.
(5) The Umpire however appointed or the Sole Arbitrator shall not be
either a national of Libya or of the Country in which the Company or any
Company which directly or indirectly controls it was incorporated nor shall he
be or have been in the employ of either of such parties or of the Government
of Libya or of any such Country as aforesaid.
The Arbitrators or, in the event they fail to agree within 60 days from
the date of appointment of the second Arbitrator, then, the Umpire, or, in the
event a Sole Arbitrator is appointed, then the Sole Arbitrator, shall determine
the applicability of this Clause and the procedure to be followed in the Arbitration.
In giving a decision the Arbitrators, the Umpire or the Sole Arbitrator,
as the case may be, shall specify an adequate period of time during which the
party to the difference or dispute against whom the decision is given shall conform to the decision, and such party shall not be in default if that party has
conformed to the decision prior to the expiry of that period.
(6) The place of Arbitration shall be such as may be agreed by such
parties and in default of agreement between them within 120 days from the
date of institution of Arbitration proceedings as specified in paragraph (2)
above, shall be determined by the Arbitrators or, in the event the Arbitrators
fail to agree within 60 days from the date of appointment of the second Arbitrator, then by the Umpire, or in the event a Sole Arbitrator is appointed,
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matic intervention by his own country.14 In between is a gradation of
devices for balancing the claim to sovereignty against the claim to security of tenure. 5
Differences in historical background account for this diversity of
schemes. The authoritative nature of the Middle East regime, where the
Sultan or Sheikh both granted the concession and dispensed the law as an
exercise of personal sovereignty, coupled with the absence from Moslem
law of an adequate counterpart to western commercial law, was incentive
enough to induce concessionaires to bargain for the settlement of disputes
by international arbitrators applying the "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."'" On the other hand, Latin American sensitivity to "gunboat diplomacy," coupled with the successful nationalization
of the Mexican petroleum industry, 7 encouraged host countries in Central and South America to include the Calvo Clause in their concession
agreements.
In the light of this diversity of approach, it is not surprising that
entirely different attitudes prevail in North America.
In the United States, the same problem of balancing the interests of
sovereignty and security of tenure does not arise, for domestic rather
than foreign investment dominates the exploitation of petroleum. Instead, the conflict occurs between the state and the private entrepreneur,
with individual rights and freedom of enterprise carrying the contest. It
then by the Sole Arbitrator.
(7)
This Concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance
with the principles of law of Libya common to the principles of international
law and in the absence of such common principles then by and in accordance
with the general principles of law, including such of those principles as may
have been applied by international tribunals.
(8)
The costs of the Arbitration shall be borne by such parties in such
proportion and manner as may be provided in the decision.
14. Peru-Article 17 of the Constitution of Peru:
In every state contract with foreigners, or in the concessions which grant
them in the latter's favour, it must be expressly stated that they will submit
to the laws and tribunals of the Republic and renounce all diplomatic claims.
See also, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua and Venezuela.
15. For example, Bolivian Petroleum Code, 26 Oct. 1955, Article 19All doubt or controversy regarding the fulfillment of the terms of the concessions and the interpretation of this law or its regulations shall be resolved
by common accord between the Executive Power and the concessionaire. In
the event of lack of agreement between the parties, the matter shall be submitted directly to the Supreme Court of Justice of Bolivia for final decision.
The emerging technique which holds promise for establishing a satisfactory relationship
between the host country and the oil company is the Joint Venture Agreement. It is
analyzed and advocated by Mughraby, supra note 2.
16. Ramazani, Choice of Law Problems and International Oil Contracts: A Case
Study, 11 IN"L & Coip. L.Q. 503 (1962).

17. BERMUDEZ, THE MEXICAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY:
IN NATIONALIZATION (1963).
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may be generalized that the federal laws governing the leasing of
petroleum rights in the public domain treat the United States as if it were
a private owner of mineral rights on no higher plane than any other individual freehold lessor.' 8
CANADIAN ATTITUDES

In Canada, there are different attitudes again. Unlike the United
States, Canada's petroleum industry, along with other industries, is dominated by foreign-controlled corporations.1 9 Most of them are Canadian
subsidiaries of United States or European companies. Many of them
have no Canadian corporate status at all, being purely foreign corporations registered to do business in a Canadian province."0 Notwithstanding
this domination of industry by foreign-controlled corporations, domestic
law in Canada (except for sporadic instances prompted by nationalist
sentiment) has ignored the foreign aspect and treated such corporations
as involving no considerations different from those applicable to domestic corporations.
So far as the oil industry in Canada is concerned, the provincial
regimes, which administer the petroleum resources, deal with the producing companies, Canadian and foreign alike, domestic or foreign capital notwithstanding, oblivious to any consideration which the foreign
nationality of producing companies may entail.
Indeed, most provincial officials would be surprised to learn that
their dealings with a foreign oil company concerning mineral rights,
should they be in derogation of acquired rights, could give rise to diplomatic intervention at Ottawa on behalf of the foreign oil company and
even to claims under international law by the foreign country against
Canada for a "denial of justice."'"
A

UNIQUE CANADIAN SOLUTION

In the preface to his study of Permanent Sovereignty Over Oil Resources,2 Muhamad A. Mughraby states: "On the municipal level most
18.

Thompson, Petroleum Land Policies Contrasted, 36 U. CoLO. L. REv. 187, 193

(1964).
19. See note 9 supra.
20. See note 29 infra.
21. The Status of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources,
note 2 supra, § 100 at p. 100:
Arbitrary annulment of a contract-concession by executive action has, in some
cases, given rise to international responsibility. "Denial of justice" has sometimes been imputed based on the failure of the Government to subject itself to
some impartial proceedings in its own established tribunals prior to giving
effect to the annulment and also on the patent uselessness of the claimant's
seeking judicial redress after the event.
22. The Middle East Research and Publishing Center, Beirut, Lebanon, 1966.
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legal systems of oil producing countries have failed to develop effective
bodies of rules to control and regulate relations with oil concessionaires,
thereby leaving the oil concession document itself as the controlling
regime." Mughraby's concern is that the Middle East oil concession
document, regarded as a contract, entrenches for a long duration, terms
of exploitation of petroleum which a new and enlightened government
considers to be detrimental to the public interest. His complaint is that
the municipal law in the Middle East has provided no legal means for
modifying these terms to make them responsive to the public interest.
In this paper, it is claimed that the oil-producing jurisdictions in
Canada have developed a legal mechanism for controlling oil agreements
so that the relationship between the government and the oil company can
be made responsive to changes which the public interest dictates. This
mechanism is a clause in oil agreements requiring the oil company to accept as binding all legislative and regulatory changes which may be enacted or promulgated from time to time in the future.
This claim justifies the analysis which follows. But this legal
mechanism must not be given an exaggerated role in terms of sovereignty
over oil resources. Legal capabilities do not exist in a vacuum. For a
government to reserve the legal power to modify the terms of oil agreements means little if the use of the power impairs the economic viability
of the petroleum industry." In the end, the worth of this legal mechanism must be measured in terms of the willingness of foreign investors to
participate in the petroleum industry on conditions acceptable to an informed and responsible government.
With this background, the Canadian approach to the conflict between sovereignty and security of tenure is now presented. As might be
expected, it is necessary to begin with historical materials. First, an examination will be made of legislative attempts to exclude foreigners from
petroleum exploration and development in Canada. Then this mechanism will be analyzed to show that it has subjected all petroleum companies, foreign included, to changes which the public interest has dictated
from time to time.
EXCLUSION OF FOREIGNERS FROM PETROLEUM EXPLORATION
AND DEVELOPMENT

It was the 1914-18 war which first made North Americans con23. Mughraby refers to the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry in 1951 as
a failure. He says: "It is beyond dispute that the national governments cannot, at
present, afford either the capital, the know-how or the marketing outlets essential for
disposing of the oil produced. Hence, it is not a workable solution for many years to
come." MUGHRABY, note 2 supra, at 53-54.
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scious of a national interest in the exploitation of petroleum resources.
By then it was recognized that great navies and merchant marines depended on oil-powered ships. In Canada, a regulation was promulgated
in 1910 which stipulated that if, in the opinion of the Minister of the Interior, petroleum was required for the use of His Majesty's Canadian
navy, then the Minister should have the right of pre-emption of all
petroleum production from Crown lands at a price to be agreed, or failing agreement, to be fixed by the Exchequer Court of Canada. 4 In the
United States, in 1909, the Secretary of the Interior was urging President Taft to support legislative action which would conserve the petroleum supply in public domain lands for the needs of the navy,25 and in
1912 two naval petroleum reserves were created out of the public domain by executive order. 6
In Canada, the threat of war brought the first restriction on entry
onto public lands for petroleum exploitation. On January 19, 1914, section 40 of the petroleum regulations was enacted providing that a company acquiring by assignment or otherwise a lease "shall at all times be
and remain a British company, registered in Great Britain or Canada
and having its principal place of business within His Majesty's Dominions and the chairman and majority of board shall at all times be
British subjects and the company shall not at any time be or become directly or indirectly controlled by foreigners or by a foreign corporation."'
Shortly after the war, the public interest was once more directed to
the stimulation of exploration. The Minister's advisers reported in 1920
that "Whereas s. 40 does not give to the Government of Canada
any more effective control over oil than if the provision had not been
inserted in the regulations, and because this restriction discourages foreign
capital so essential to the exploration and testing of vacant Dominion
lands thought to contain oil," therefore section 40 should be re-enacted
to stipulate merely that "Any company acquiring by assignment or otherwise a lease under the provisions of these regulations shall be a company
24. P.C. 1951 of Oct. 12, 1910.
25. Prior to the withdrawal orders, R. A. Ballinger, Secretary of the Interior,
wrote to President Taft under date of September 17, 1909, stating the navy's needs:
The six largest battleships in commission or under construction are equipped
for the use of either oil or coal and the fourteen latest destroyers use oil exclusively.
The Navy has a further interest in the conservation of the petroleum supply
by reason of the absolutely necessary use of petroleum products for lubrication.
The time appears opportune for legislative action that will assure the conservation of an adequate supply of petroleum for the Government's own
needs. .

26.
27.

..

No. 1 on Sept. 2, 1912, and No. 2 on Dec. 13, 1912.
Section 40 of General Petroleum Regulations, P.C. 154, Jan. 19, 1914.
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registered or licensed in Canada and having its principal place of business
within His Majesty's Dominion."2 This provision has been carried forward to current legislation, so that since the transfer of natural resources
from the federal government to the provincial governments in 1930, the
Alberta regulations and statutes as a provincial example, have stipulated
only that foreign companies be registered in Alberta to be entitled to receive grants of petroleum rights from the Crown.29
Meanwhile, in the United States, the congressional debates leading
to the enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act, 1920, included sharp contention about the role of foreigners on the public domain. The Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Public Lands reported that the Senate bill
contained the following provision:
Provided, That no alien shall, by stock ownership or otherwise,
own any interest in a lease acquired under the provisions of this
act, except as hereinafter provided, and all certificates for stock
hereafter issued in any corporation having such a lease shall
specifically and clearly show this provision on the face thereof.
His comment was that "[T] his proviso was not put in the bill without the most serious consideration.

.

.

. All men know that the control

of oil in a country means a control of the commerce of that country."8
As referred to the House of Representatives, this proviso was changed,
so that section 1 of the bill now declared that the public domain minerals
were to be subject to disposition:
[To] citizens of the United States, or to any associations of
such persons, or to any corporation organized under the laws of
the United States, or of any State or Territory thereof . .
Provided, that no alien shall, by stock ownership or otherwise,
own any interest in a lease acquired under the provisions of
28.
29.

P.C. 105, Jan. 29, 1920.
THE MINES AND MINERALS ACr, 1962, 1962 (Alta.) c. 49, § 44:
(1) A corporation shall not acquire an agreement in whole or in part by
application or transfer unless the corporation is

(a)
(b)

registered under The Companies Act of the Province,
incorporated by an Act of the Province and approved by the Minister as a corporation that may acquire an agreement,
(c) incorporated under the Bank Act (Canada),
(d) a railway company incorporated under an Act of Canada,
(e) a trust company registered under The Trust Companies Act, 1960, or
(f)
an insurance company licensed under The Alberta Insurance Act.
(2) No syndicate or other association of persons shall acquire an agreement in whole or in part by application or transfer in the name of the association unless it has been incorporated by or under an Act of the Province, and approved by the Minister as an association that may hold an
agreement.
30. Senator Smoot, 58 CONG. REc. 4112 (1919).
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this Act, except with a specific provision in such lease authorizing the President, in his discretion, to take over and operate
such lease, paying just compensation to the owner.. . ,
However, in the House less chauvinistic attitudes prevailed. The
House Committee on Public Lands amended the proviso "to avoid retaliatory action against America's investors in foreign countries." After
all, "the citizens of the United States could largely offset such a result by
their own operations in foreign countries [by hindsight, a gross understatement], or, if an acute situation ever developed, a general embargo
against exportation would be a sufficient remedy." 2 This House proposal carried the day, and appeared in section 1 of the Mineral Leasing
Act, 1920, as:
And provided further, That citizens of another country, the
laws, customs, or regulations of which, deny similar or like
privileges to citizens or corporations of this country, shall not
by stock ownership, stock holding, or stock control, own any
interest in any lease acquired under the provisions of this Act. 8
In Canada, forays into the field of restriction on foreign entry into
petroleum operations have been occasional, fed by nationalist sentiment.
When Prime Minister Diefenbaker was gaining his reputation as "antiAmerican" in recent years, a factor contributing to this characterization
was the inclusion in the Canada Oil and Gas Land Regulations of 1961," 4
of a provision said to keep foreign investment out of the federallycontrolled northern lands by ensuring that only Canadian citizens and
corporations would be granted oil and gas leases. This patriotic provision read as follows:
s. 55 (1) Upon application to the Minister, a permittee
shall be granted an oil and gas lease.
(2) An oil and gas lease shall not be granted under
this section (a) to a person unless the Minister
is satisfied that he is a Canadian citizen over
twenty-one years of age, and that he will be
the beneficial owner of the interest to be
granted;
(b) to a corporation incorporated outside of
Canada; or
31.
32.

S. 2775, referred to House of Representatives on Sept. 4, 1919.
H.R. Rep. No. 398, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919).

33. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1952).
34.

P.C. 1961-797 (am P.C. 1963-408; P.C. 1961-1614), see 1 LEWIS & THoMPsoN,
Fed. [4] (1957).

CANADIAN OIL AND GAS,
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(c) to a corporation unless the Minister is
satisfied
(i)
that at least fifty percent of the issued shares of the corporation is
beneficially owned by persons who
are Canadian citizens, or
(ii) that the shares of the corporation
are listed on a recognized Canadian
stock exchange and that Canadians
will have an opportunity of participating in the financing and ownership of the corporation; or
(iii) that the shares of the corporation
are wholly owned by a corporation
that meets the qualifications outlined in subparagraph (i) or (ii)
of this paragraph.
It is unlikely that this restriction has diminished foreign investment. In many cases it has merely caused a re-organization of the
corporate forms by which international oil companies participate in the
northern lands.35 The requirement of listing on a Canadian stock exchange to gain the exception from the restriction has not proved difficult
to meet, nor has it resulted in any substantial increase in Canadian
ownership. In fact, the legislation has meant little more than that United
States and other foreign oil companies that were operating in Canada
through foreign-incorporated subsidiaries now operate through subsidiaries incorporated in Canada whose shares are listed on the Montreal,
Toronto, or Calgary stock exchanges, but are too closely held to be traded
on a day-to-day basis. 6
In summary, these legislative provisions for the exclusion of foreigners from petroleum exploration and development in Canada have
served more as palliatives to patriotism than as purposeful attempts to
35. For example, in 1962 the operations of "Mobil Oil of Canada Ltd.," a Delaware
corporation, were transferred to "Socony Mobil Oil of Canada, Ltd.," incorporated pursuant to the laws of Canada. This company has now changed its name to "Mobil Oil
Canada, Ltd."
36. The restriction may even have had the reverse effect of increasing foreign investment. To qualify for inclusion in a consolidated return with the parent company for
United States income tax purposes, it would be necessary for a Canadian-incorporated
subsidiary to show that its northern operations were essential to its overall operation in
Canada, and commitments as to the amounts of expenditures to be made on the northern
lands would have to be given to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, thereby increasing the
investment which the company might otherwise have been prepared to make.
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keep the oil resources as a private preserve for Canadian capital. They
demonstrate that even in a country as developed as Canada, the requirements for risk capital demand foreign participation in the petroleum
industry. 7
MECHANISM

FOR KEEPING OIL AGREEMENTS

RESPONSIVE TO

PUBLIC INTEREST

The Crown as Lessor
Her Majesty the Queen represents the state in Canada, either in the
right of Canada with respect to federally-owned petroleum lands, or in
the right of a province with respect to provincially-owned petroleum
lands. 8 Dispositions of petroleum rights are made under a system of
enabling statutes and general regulations passed pursuant thereto, the
forms of dispositions being exploratory permits, licenses, reservations, and development leases.39 In the Province of Alberta, the grantor
of a state lease is:
Her Majesty the Queen in right of Alberta, hereinafter called
"Her Majesty," represented herein by the Minister of Mines
and Minerals of the Province of Alberta, hereinafter called the
"Minister."
Such a lease is called a "Crown lease." Like most leases, the Crown
lease operates both as conveyance and contract, containing the usual
anatomy of a deed (grant, habendum and reddendum) together with a
schedule of covenants and agreements. Using the word "Crown" to signify Her Majesty, the position of the Crown as proprietor and as contracting party must first be stated in general terms.
G. A. Holland, in an article entitled The Federal Case,4" argues that
the Crown, as proprietor of lands, has no power to dispose of mines and
minerals otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the provincial or federal legislation dealing with the disposition of Crown mineral rights. He bases his argument on the rule that the prerogative rights
of the Crown may be abrogated or abridged by statute, and that, a fortiori,
the ordinary proprietary rights of the Crown may be annulled by the
37. The present government of Canada is reported to be taking a more positive
approach by offering subsidies to Canadian companies of 40% of exploration costs in
northern lands. The Edmonton Journal, September 7, 1966, p. 43.
38. For a fuller treatment of this subject, see Thompson, supra note 10, at 214.
39. Canadian oil and gas statutes and regulations are published in current text in
2, 3 LEWIs & THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 34.
40. 3 ALTA. L. REv. 393 (1964).
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legislature." There seems no doubt that legislative provisions must be
complied with by government when dealing with Crown minerals. Some
doubt remains whether the proprietary rights of the Crown authorize
the imposition by the government of terms and conditions in mineral
dispositions which, though not provided for in the legislation, are not
inconsistent therewith, in the same way that an ordinary proprietor may
impose such terms and conditions as he wishes not contrary to law.42
With respect to contract, the position is that the Crown may enforce contractual rights against ordinary persons, and since the enactment of statutes modeled on The Crown Proceedings Act of 1947 (Great
Britain), ordinary persons may, as of right and without fiat, obtain remedies for breach of contract against the Crown.43
It has been held in England that it is not competent for the Crown
to fetter its future executive action by contract, 4 but this doctrine has

been criticized, 5 and in the case in which the doctrine was propounded,
it is pointed out that the contract there in question was not a commercial
contract, as to which "no doubt the Government can bind itself through
its officers .... "46 There seems no limit on the power of the Crown
to bind itself by contractual terms in dispositions of Crown minerals subject to the restrictions imposed by legislation.
In Alberta, such legislation on the one hand prohibits the sale of
Crown minerals except under the authority of an Act of the legislature,47
and on the other hand empowers the Lieutenant Governor in Council
41. The rule is stated in 7 HALSBURY (3rd ed.) § 465, as follows:
Where 'by statute the Crown is empowered to do what it might heretofore
have done by virtue of its prerogative, it can no longer act under the prerogative, and must act under and subject to the conditions imposed by the statute;
but the statute may expressly preserve the right to act under the prerogative.
42. The Crown's proprietary rights are probably no different from those of ordinary persons. If they are in any way special powers or privileges over and above those
of ordinary persons, they would qualify as prerogative rights, but even these are subject
to statutory restriction (see note 41 supra). Mr. Holland seems wrong in giving to the
Imperial Crown Lands Act of 1702 the effect of depriving the Crown in Alberta of
proprietary rights with respect to minerals because the Crown Lands Act was not likely
intended to apply to lands in the colonies (see Lord Asquith of Bishopstone in AttorneyGeneral Alta. v. Huggard Assets Ltd., [1953] A.C. 420). However, the Alberta Mines
and Minerals Act, 1962, controls the exercise of the Crown's proprietary rights in mines
and minerals.
43. 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44 (Imp.). The Canadian statutes are: Alta., THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE CROWN AcT, 1959 (Alta.) c. 63; B.C., CROWN PROCF DINGS AcT,

R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 89; Sask., PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE
Federal,CROWN LIABILITY AcT, 1952-53 (Can.) c. 30.

CROWN

Act, R.S.S. 1953, c. 79;

44. Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King, [1921] 3 K.B. 500 (Rowlatt, J.).
45. Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, [1949] 1 K.B. 227 (Denning, J.), criticized
in turn in Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Ltd., [1951] A.C. 837 (Simonds, L.J.).
46. Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King, [1921] 3 K.B. 500, 503 (Rowlatt,

J.).

47.

MINES AND MINERALS

AcT, 1962, 1962 (Alta.) c. 49, § 20.
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(the cabinet) to authorize the Minister to make or enter into an agreement applicable to any special case for which no provision is made by
the Act."8 In result, under cabinet authority, the Minister can make special agreements with respect to the disposition of mines and minerals.
Such special agreements are rare exceptions, dealing only with cases that
are not provided for in the general regulations."' Because the general
regulations deal comprehensively with all types of petroleum substances
and all kinds of operations, the rule is that all oil companies operate under terms and conditions of general application, and the government does
not grant special concessions.
The Royalty Provisions
Through the years the imposition of gross royalty has been a principal means of providing benefit to the state in Canada in return for
production of oil from Crown petroleum resources.5" Prior to 1930 the
Crown petroleum lands in western Canada were federally owned and administered. In that year their ownership and administration were transferred to the respective provinces.5 '
A study of the royalty provisions during the period of federal administration by the Department of the Interior prior to 1930 and during
the provincial administrations since then will introduce the mechanism
by which even royalty rates are varied as the public interest requires.
The first federal mining regulations promulgated in 188452 did not
differentiate petroleum from other minerals. These regulations applied
"to all Dominion lands containing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, copper,
petroleum, iron, or other mineral deposit of economic value, with the
exception of coal." Provision was made for the grant of forty-acre
mineral patents on proof of actual discovery. In 1887 petroleum was
singled out with iron ore for special treatment by way of enlarged locations of 160 acres. 8 By 1890 it was acknowledged that the requirement
of an actual discovery "may operate to retard the development of lands
supposed to contain petroleum," and entry might now be made on affi48. Id., § 14(b).
49. For example, the Minister of Mines and Minerals in Alberta makes special
agreements under this authority in order to dispose of Crown minerals to a farmer who
is prepared to operate for his personal use an oil or gas well which is not a commercial
producer.
50. Other means are fees, rentals and bonus payments. In addition, oil companies
are subject to the same local and federal taxes (including income taxes) as other commercial and mining companies in Canada.
51. See note 69 infra. For a detailed statement of this transfer of natural resources
from federal to provincial ownership, see Thompson, supra note 10, at 214.
52. P.C. 443, March 7, 1884.
53. P.C. 1976, Oct. 5, 1887, Reg. 13.
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davit "that from indications he [the locator] verily believes that petroleum exists on the location applied for. . .

."

Within five years a mineral

patent could be earned by proof of production of petroleum in
quantities.54 The first patents reserved to the Crown a royalty
and one-half percent on sales of minerals, 5 but in 1887 a realism
ways prevalent in public service prompted the draughtsman of a
tion repealing the reservation of royalties to explain:

paying
of two
not alregula-

The attempt to collect royalties upon gold and silver has proved
abortive in British Columbia, as has every form of collecting
the same impost in Australia. No charge of the kind being imposed outside the Railway Belt in British Columbia or in the
neighboring States of the American Union, it would be impossible to enforce it in our territory. A revenue of equal value,
but more easily collectible, and less offensive, because no inquisitorial proceedings are necessary for its collection, can be
obtained from the fees required to be paid annually until the issue of patent; and the territorial revenue in the North-West
might be largely augumented, as in British Columbia, by requiring miners and prospectors to take out licenses. 5
The first regulation to deal specially with petroleum was passed in
1898."7 It permitted the reservation of 640 acres for six months for
prospecting and provided for the sale of the land at one dollar per acre if
oil in paying quantities should be found. Royalty to the Crown was reserved at the rate of two and one-half percent. This regulation was replaced by what might be described as the first general petroleum regulations in 1901.58 The royalty rate was changed to the formula which has
since, in various forms, become the keystone of policy to ensure that the
terms of oil agreements can be amended from time to time as conditions and the public interest require. That formula provided that the
royalty should be at "such rate as may from time to time be specified
by Order in Council." Hence, with respect to royalty, it was then established that there would be no entitlement on the part of an operator to
payment only of a fixed royalty of long duration. Instead, such an important element in the agreement as royalty would be left to be stipulated
from time to time by the government through the instrumentality of an
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

P.C.
P.C.
P.C.
P.C.
P.C.

2774, Dec. 18, 1890.
443, March 7, 1884, Reg. 81.
1976, Oct. 5, 1887.
1822, Aug. 6, 1898.
898, May 31, 1901.
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order-in-council.Y
Possibly this significant change in the regulations was palatable to
oil prospectors because in 1901 no royalty was being charged, and, in the
infant stage of the industry, with no oil then being produced in western
Canada, there was little prospect that a royalty would be exacted in the
foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the government must have wished to
allay any reluctance on the part of investors which this open-ended royalty provision might induce, for, when introducing a leasing system in
the place of patents in 1910,6o the regulations continued the royalty on
natural gas "at such rate as may from time to time be specified by Order
in Council,"61 but, as to petroleum, gave the assurance that:
[N]o royalty shall be charged upon the sales of petroleum acquired from the Crown under the provisions of the Regulations
up to the 1st day of January, 1930, but provision shall be made
in the leases issued for such rights that after the above date the
petroleum products of the location shall be subject to whatever
regulations in respect of the payment of royalty may then or
thereafter be made. "
Accordingly, the first petroleum and natural gas leases issued by the
Department of the Interior prescribed a royalty as follows:
[A]nd also rendering and paying therefor unto His Majesty
a royalty at such rate as may from time to time be prescribed by
Order of the Governor General of Canada in Council on natural
gas products taken out of the said lands, and also such royalty
on petroleum products taken out of the said lands from and after the year 1930 as the regulations then and thereafter in force
may prescribe. .

.

. (Emphasis added.) 6 3

The purpose of the new leasing system was explained by the department in retrospect, as follows:
The principal differences between these regulations and those
preceding were the substitution of leasing for selling and the
acceptance of expenditure in satisfaction of rental. By inserting the latter provision, the Dominion recognized the heavy cost
59. An order-in-council in Canadian parliamentary practice is a cabinet decree
made pursuant to legislative mandate. When signed by the Prime Minister and gazetted,
it has the force of law. The system is described in Thompson, Petroleuma Land Policies
Contrasted, 36 U. COLO. L. REv. 187, 211-13 (1964).
60. P.C. 414, March 11, 1910.
61. Id. at Reg. 24.
62. Id. at Reg. 23.
63. Form no. 253-483.
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to the lessee of installing machinery and carrying on drilling
operations, and in pursuance of the policy of encouraging development relieved him of the necessity of paying rental in cash
for the second and third years. On the same principle the charging of royalty was deferred for approximately twenty years to
enable a petroleum industry to be established. As a matter of
fact, it was not until nearly the end of this period that oil in
commercial quantity was obtained in the Turner Valley area.
(Emphasis added.) 6
Notwithstanding this solicitude for an infant industry, the federal
administrators apparently rued their generosity, for in 1919 they withdrew this twenty-year moratorium on royalties by an order-in-council
which re-enacted Regulation 23 of 1910. Now, instead of the moratorium, the regulations provided that:
The sales of the products of any location acquired under the
provisions of these regulations shall be subject to the payment
to the Crown of such royalty thereon as may from time to time
be fixed by the Governor-in-Council . . 5
This open-ended provision continued in the leasing regulations down
to 1930 when the provincial authorities took over the administration of
Crown resources, and has been continued in provincial regulations and
statutes in Alberta and Saskatchewan to this date. 6 More will be said
later in this article as to its operation in current oil and gas agreements.
Though the moratorium was lifted, no royalty was exacted during
the period of federal administration down to 1930. It was this factor,
together with other evidences of largesse in the treatment of lessees by
the federal department, 8 that contributed to provincial demands in the
decade prior to 1930 for the transfer of natural resources in the western
provinces from federal to provincial administration. The political settlement, which resulted in the transfer agreement of 1930,9 included pro64. Information Prepared for Dominion Counsel, J. McGregor Stewart, K.C., by
Department of the Interior; Lands, Northwest Territories & Yukon Branch, Ottawa,
December 30, 1934, Vol. J, ALBERTA RESOURCES COMMISSION, 1934.
65. P.C. 2433, Dec. 3, 1919.
66. MINES AND MINERALS ACT, 1962 Alta. c. 49, § 31(2) ; THE MINERAL RESOURCES
ACT, 1959 Sask. c. 84, § 17(1).
67. See notes 107-11 infra and accompanying text.
68. For example, defaults in payments of rentals and in performance of work commitments were normally waived by the Department of the Interior, see, Dominion exhibits 17D and 18D in Vol. V. Information Prepared for Dominion Counsel, ALBERTA
RESOURCES CoMmiSSIoN, 1934.
69. ALBERTA NATURAL RESOURCES ACT, 1930 Can. c. 3, 1930 Alta. c. 21; SASKATCHEWAN NATURAL RESOURCES ACT, 1930 Can. 1. 41, 1930 Sask. c. 87; MANITOBA NATURAL
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vision for the establishment of Royal Commissions for Alberta and
Saskatchewan before which the federal authorities would give an account of their stewardship of resources.7" The Commissions could then
determine the compensation which the federal government should pay to
the provinces for the period of federal administration. 7 '
In this atmosphere of critical appraisal by the provinces of federal
policies with respect to Crown lands, it is not surprising that the provincial authorities immediately established regulations requiring the payment of royalties-in Alberta, a five percent royalty for a period of four
years, a ten percent royalty for the following five years, and a twelve
and one-half percent royalty thereafter on production from Crown leases
acquired under the petroleum and natural gas regulations."2
Nor is it surprising that those who had obtained patents or leases of
Crown minerals during the federal administration should anticipate
more grasping landlords under the provincial regimes, and should ask
federal authorities to include "savings" clauses in the 1930 transfer
agreements.
The federal authorities were mindful of the commitments which
they had given during their administration, and they, too, were distrustful of the willingness of the provincial regimes to honor them. Therefore, they used their bargaining position to exact from the provinces
undertakings that:
2. The Province will carry out in accordance with the
terms thereof every contract to purchase or lease any Crown
RESOURCES

ACT, 1930 Can. c. 29, 1930 Man. c. 30;

BRITIsH NORTH AMERICA

ACT, 1930

Imp. c. 26.

70. Section 1 of the schedule to the

ALBERTA NATURAL RESOURCES ACT

reads:

1. In order that the Province may 'be in the same position as the original
provinces of Confederation are in virtue of section 109 of The British North
America Act, 1867, the interest of the Crown in all Crown lands, mines, minerals (precious and base) and royalties derived therefrom within the Province,
and all sums due or payable for such lands, mines, minerals or royalties, shall,
from and after the coming into force of this Agreement and subject as therein
otherwise provided, belong to the Province, subject to any trusts existing in
respect thereof, and to any interest other than that of the Crown in the same,
and the said lands, mines, minerals and royalties shall be administered by the
Province for the purposes thereof, subject, until the Legislature of the Province otherwise provides, to the provisions of any Act of the Parliament of
Canada relating to such administration; any payment received by Canada in
respect of any such lands, mines, minerals or royalties before the coming into
force of this Agreement shall continue to belong to Canada whether paid in
advance or otherwise, it being the intention that, except as herein otherwise
specially provided, Canada shall not be liable to account to the Province for
any payment made in respect of any of the said land, mines, minerals, or royalties before the coming into force of this Agreement, and that the Province
shall not be liable to account to Canada for any such payment made thereafter.
71. Alberta Natural Resources Commission, 1934.
72. O.C. 687/31, June 18, 1931 (Alta.).
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lands, mines or minerals and every other arrangement whereby
any person has become entitled to any interest therein as against
the Crown, and further agrees not to affect or alter any term
of any such contract to purchase, lease or other arrangement by
legislation or otherwise, except either with the consent of all the
parties thereto other than Canada or in so far as any legislation may apply generally to all similar agreements relating to
lands, mines or minerals in the Province or to interest therein,
irrespective of whom may be the parties thereto.
By 1936, following a change of government in Alberta,7 and with
the Turner Valley field providing the first flush production of oil in the
province,7" the royalty regulations were revised to provide for a ten percent royalty on production, including products obtained by separation,
absorption, etc. This new regulation was to apply to "any location acquired under the provisions of the regulations for the disposal of petroleum and natural gas rights in provincial lands, whether made by Canada
or the Provinces. . . ." (Emphasis added.) 75
Thereafter, royalty regulations in Alberta and Saskatchewan attempted to carry provincial jurisdiction as far as possible in the way of
imposing royalties on Crown grantees who had acquired their rights during the federal period.7
73. The first Social Credit government was elected to office in August, 1935.
74. Turner Valley Royalties No. 1 well came in on June 16, 1936, beginning the
fourth phase of the Turner Valley field which, by 1939 established a yearly production
of 7,594,411 barrels. See F. K. Beach and J. L. Irwin, The History of Alberta Oil, The
Dept. of Lands and Mines, Alberta.
75. O.C. 440/36, March 30, 1936 (Alta.).

76. The

MINES AND MINERALS

AcT, 1962 Alta. c. 49:

5. Notwithstanding anything in any agreement or certificate of record made
or entered into
(a) under the former Act or the regulations thereunder, or
(b) under the Provincial Lands Act or the Dominion Lands Act or the
regulations under those Acts and relating to a mineral,
every such agreement or certificate of record and any renewal or re-issue
thereof is in every respect subject to this Act and the regulations made
under this Act.
31. Royalty
(1) A royalty is reserved to the Crown in right of Alberta on the mineral
that may be won, worked, recovered or obtained pursuant to any
agreement or certificate of record made or entered into under this Act.
(2) The royalty, to be computed, levied and collected on the mineral won,
worked, recovered or obtained pursuant to any agreement or certificate
of record made or entered into under this Act, the former Act or
The Provincial Lands Act shall be the royalty prescribed from time
to time by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.
(3) Where the payment of a royalty has been reserved to the Crown in
right of Canada in any patent, agreement for sale, lease or other
agreement that conveys a mineral or the right to win, work, recover
or obtain the same, there is payable to the Crown in right of Alberta,
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These provincial attempts to foist royalties on Crown lessees were,
expectedly, resisted, and there followed a series of court cases construing
the effect of the "savings" clause in the Natural Resources Acts. The
decisions in these cases, at the highest level of authority, provide the only
judicial pronouncements in Canada dealing with a clash between government policy and the acquired rights of petroleum producers.
The Case Law
The issue of security of the acquired rights of the Crown grantees
arose in the royalty cases in the following way: the province prescribed
a royalty by regulation and sought to exact payment of it from a Crown
grantee who had acquired his rights under the federal administration
prior to 1930; the Crown grantee resisted payment on the ground that
the attempt to exact royalty was a violation of the saving provision in
section 2 of the schedule of the Natural Resources Act; the province
answered that, while no royalty had been levied during the federal regime,
the rights of the Crown grantee prior to 1930 were subject to regulations
prescribing royalties which might from time to time be made, and, therefore, the province, when now prescribing a royalty, was not doing anything which the federal authorities could not have done prior to the transfer of natural resources. In this answer lies the contention that the rights
of the Crown grantee were subject to variation from time to time by
unilateral regulatory action of the grantor, the Crown. This contention
requires examination.
In Attorney-General for Alberta v. Magestic Mines Ltd." the plaintiff's mineral patent, issued in 1908, contained the following words:
"Yielding and paying unto Us and Our Successors, the royalty, if any,
prescribed by the regulations. . . ." The province argued that the phrase
"if any prescribed" must refer to the future. Dismissing the province's
claim to royalty, Mr. Justice Hudson speaking for the Supreme Court of
Canada, said:
and there shall be computed, levied and collected.
(a) the royalty prescribed from time to time by the Lieutenant Governor in Council in accordance with the Transfer Agreement, or
(b) the royalty at the rate in effect immediately prior to the coming
into force of the Transfer Agreement.
THE MINERAL RESOURCES AcT, 1959 Sask. c. 84, § 17(3) provides:
If and in so far as any of the provisions of this section are at variance with
any of the provisions of the agreement between the Government of Canada and
the Government of Saskatchewan, set forth in the schedule to chapter 87 of the
statutes of 1930, as amended, the provisions of the said agreement as amended,
govern but this section shall nevertheless stand and be valid and operative in all
other respects.
77. [1942] S.C.R. 402.
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The real question in the appeal is whether or not the provisions
of the patent were such as to reserve to the Crown a right to
impose new royalties in the future. I think that if the Crown,
like any other vendor, wishes to reserve such rights, such reservations must be expressly stated.
Parliament, and the Legislature within its jurisdiction, of
course, have power to impose new taxes, but the imposition of a
royalty on lands or goods of a subject by Executive order could
be justified only by the clearest, and most definite authority
from the competent legislative body."8
The requirement of clear and explicit language had been stated by
Mr. Justice Duff in the earlier Supreme Court case of Spooner Oils Ltd.
v. Turner Valley Gas Conservation Board.7" There, the issue did not
concern royalties, but whether or not the province could impose a gas
conservation scheme on lessees who had acquired their rights during the
federal regime. Section 1 of the regulations of 1910 conditioned a renewal on a showing by the lessee that "during the term of the lease he has
complied fully with the conditions of such lease and with the provisions
of the Regulations in force from time to time during the currency of the
lease." Denying the province's contention that the lessee was bound by
the lease terms to comply with the new gas conservation regulations,
Mr. Justice Duff said:
It is difficult, no doubt, to think it could have been intended
that the lessee's right of renewal should be conditioned upon the
performance, during the term antecedent to its renewal, of obligations which the lessee was not required to observe as contractual terms of the lease. But to us it seems clear that, if it
had been intended to incorporate, as one of the terms of the
lease, a stipulation that all future regulations touching the working of the property should become part of the lease as contractual obligations, that intention would have been expressed, not
inferentially, but in plain language."0
Apparently, the words of a patent issued in 1913 "Yielding and paying unto Us and Our Successors such royalty upon the said petroleum
and natural gas, if any, from time to time prescribed by regulations of
78. Id. at 405.
79. [1933] 4 D.L.R. 545.
80. Id. at 556. Mr. Justice Duff's approach to the problem is followed with similar
results in the dissenting judgment of Mr. Justice Estey in Attorney-General for Sask. v.
Whiteshore Salt and Chemical Co., [1955] 1 D.L.R. 241, 258.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1967

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 [1967], Art. 5

CANADIAN PETROLEUM LEGISLATION
our Governor in Council" were plain enough. In HuggardAssets Ltd. v.
Attorney General for Alberta,1 the Privy Council held that such words
authorized the province, as standing in the shoes of the Dominion, to, levy
royalties by a regulation, or a succession of regulations, made after the
date of the patent. Because this power was reserved in the patent, the action of the province was not a violation of the savings provision in section
2 of the schedule to the Natural Resources Act. Nor was the reservation
of a royalty which might be varied in the future at the whim of the
grantor void for uncertainty.82
In summary the Crown agreement by express and plain language
can provide that the rights conferred on the grantee shall be subject to
change from time to time in accordance with regulations made by the
grantor (the Crown) in its legislative capacity."3
This summation recognizes the Crown as enjoying two capacities,
one as legislator exercising authority to regulate which is delegated to the
lieutenant-governor in council (the cabinet) by the Legislative Assembly, and the other as proprietor making a conveyance of minerals and
contracting with respect thereto through the office of the Minister of
Mines and Minerals and his Deputy Minister. This dual position of the
Crown has been expressly noted in the cases. Mr. Justice Duff, in the
Spooner case, first held that nothing in the 1928 order-in-council bringing into force section 29 of the regulations (dealing with the waste of
gas) gave section 29 retroactive legislative effect so as to modify leases
granted under the regulations of 1910 and 1911. He then added: "The
other aspect, from which this point must be considered, presents for examination the question whether s. 29 constitutes a part of the contract
84
between the Crown and the lessee by force of the contract itself."
In Attorney General for British Columbia v. Deeks Sand & Gravel
Co. the distinction between the two capacities of the Crown in contract
5

81. [1953] A.C. 420, 8 W.W.R. (NS) 561, [19531 3 D.L.R. 225 (P.C.). This
case was one of the last appeals to the Privy Council before its authority as a final appellate tribunal for Canada in civil causes was vested in the Supreme Court of Canada.
82. The opinion of Their Lordships on this second point was expressed obiter.
83. A similar result has been reached in Western Australia where the government
in 1886 contracted to grant railway subsidy lands in fee simple "in accordance with and
in the form prescribed by the Land Regulations of the Colony." The Privy Council held
that the agreement "imposes on the Crown no more than an irrevocable obligation to
grant a fee simple of the surface of the land in whatever might be the form current at
the date when any particular grant was called for, without the addition of a further
obligation to ensure that the legislature will not at any time during the currency of the
contract alter the prescribed form of grant." In this case, a statute of 1936 reserved
petroleum to the Crown. See Midland Ry. of W. Australia, Ltd. v. W. Australia, [1956]
3 All E.R. 272 (P.C.).
84. [1933] 4 D.L.R. 545, 553.
85. [1956] S.C.R. 336.
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and in legislation was carried to the point where an agreement between the
Crown and the company was upheld although legislation of similar purport would have been ultra vires as violative of the Railway Belt Agreement (similar to the Natural Resources Agreements for Alberta and
Saskatchewan). The ruling was that the Crown had power to impose
royalties under a compromise agreement whereby a Crown lease was renewed "subject to adjustment for each successive five year period both
with regard to rental and royalty," notwithstanding that the Crown
could not have validly imposed royalties by statute or regulation in view
of the savings clause in the Railway Belt Agreement. In effect, a claim
(the right to prescribe a royalty by statute or regulation) which might
subsequently be determined to be unfounded in law, could validly form
the basis of a compromise agreement by the Crown just as it could by
any ordinary contracting party.
In light of the case authority, which has upheld at the highest level
the variable royalty clause in the face of the savings clause in the Natural
Resources Agreements, it is clear that domestic law in the Canadian jurisdictions recognizes as binding by force of contract any clause in an oil
agreement with the Crown that subjects its terms and conditions to any
changes subsequently to be made by statute or regulation. Legal advisers
to the Crown would have been remiss in their responsibilities not to have
advocated use of this technique of legislation by contract were there no
firm resistance from grantees.
To complete this paper, it is proposed to examine the use which has
been made of such clauses, and to comment on their legal efficacy as
well as their role in balancing the claims of sovereignty and of acquired
rights.
The Federal Leases Prior to 1930
Beginning with the first lease form, adopted under the regulations
of 1910 which introduced the leasing system, the development of three
parts of the lease reveals the evolution of this phenomenon of contract by
legislation. These three parts are:
1. Renewal:
[R]enewable for a further term of twenty-one years provided
the lessee furnishes evidence satisfactory to the Minister of the
Interior to show that during the term of the lease he has complied fully with the conditions of such lease and with the provisions of the regulations under which it was granted. . .
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1967
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2. Royalty:
[A]nd also rendering and paying therefor unto His Majesty a
royalty at such rate as may from time to time be prescribed by
Order of the Governor General of Canada in Council on natural
gas products taken out of the said lands, and also such royalty
on petroleum products taken out of the said lands from and after the year 1930 as the regulations then and thereafter in force
may prescribe.
3. Compliance with laws:
That the lessee shall and will well, truly and faithfully observe,
perform and abide by all the obligations, conditions, provisos
and restrictions in or under the said regulations imposed upon
lessees or upon the said lessee.
In 1914, the "compliance with laws" provision was reinforced with the
following additional clause:
And provided further and it is hereby declared that this lease
is subject in all respects to the regulations of the Governor in
Council, relating to petroleum, and to any regulations that may
be issued in amendment of and in substitution therefor.
In 1920 the royalty provision was altered to read:
[A]nd also rendering and paying therefor unto His Majesty a
royalty at such rate as may from time to time be prescribed by
Order of the Governor General of Canada in Council on the
products taken out of the said lands ...
During the period of federal administration, this 1920 alteration
was the final change in the lease form which had any bearing on the
question of variation of the lease contract in accordance with changing
statutes and regulations. Apart from the matter of royalties, the position of the lessee at this time may be summed up as secure in the usual
sense that the position of a contracting party is safeguarded, namely,
that the ambit of his rights and obligations is expressly and finally delimited in the contract document. Of the "renewal," "royalty" and "compliance with laws" provisions, only the "royalty" provision referred to
future regulations. Only the additional "compliance with laws" provision, inserted into the lease in 1914, suggested that the lessee might be
expected to comply with not only current but also future regulations. But
applying the strict approach to construction of such clauses which is required by the case law, it is probable that this additional clause had no
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol1/iss2/5
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more effect than to stipulate that the lease was subject to future regulations, if such regulationswere, proprio zigore, applicable thereto. Stating
the matter another way, if a future regulation should be made applicable
retroactively to existing agreements by the order-in-council bringing it
into force, then the clause made it clear that the lease was subject to it.
The binding force of the new regulation would be derived from its status
as legislation and not by reason of the provision in the lease, which
would merely serve as notice to the lessee that his rights were no different from those of any other contracting party who runs the risk under
Canadian law of having his rights adversely affected by retroactive legislation. Canadian constitutional law, under the rubric of supremacy of
parliament, does not recognize a fundamental right to due process or to
the continuance of acquired rights notwithstanding the will of the legislature. But like any other contracting party whose rights are retroactively
affected by legislation, the lessee would have the benefit of a political
climate which views retroactive legislation as confiscatory, to be resorted
to only in extreme cases, and of legal rules which require retroactive legislation to be given a strict construction and to carry with it an implied
right to compensation should there be a deprivation of property. 6 As an
example of the strict construction given to purported retroactive legislation, Mr. Justice Duff, in the Spooner case,"1 refused to find in the 1928
order-in-council any language which required the court to hold that it was
intended to apply retroactively to leases granted under the 1910
regulations.
Alberta Leases After 1930

The transition from federal to provincial administration in 1930
following the Natural Resources Acts 8 caused few immediate changes to
be made in either the petroleum and natural gas regulations 9 or in the
lease forms. The first Alberta lease continued the same "renewal" and
"royalty" clauses as in the Dominion lease. Only the "compliance with
laws" provisions revealed the touch of a new draughtsman. The first
such "compliance" provision read:
[T]he lessee will at all times perform, observe and comply with
all the provisions of the regulations made pursuant to The Provincial Lands Act and of the regulations made pursuant to The
86. Even this right to compensation may be taken away by express language in the
expropriating statute.

87.

[1933] 4 D.L.R. 545, 553.

88. See note 69 supra for the statutory references.
89. O.C. 669-31, June 18, 1931, made under the authority of the PROVINCIAL LANDS
ACT, 1931 (Alta.) c. 43, basically continued the federal regulations.
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Oil and Gas Wells Act, 1931, or any regulations which may at
any time hereafter be made under the authority of the aforesaid
Acts or either of them, or of any Act passed in substitution
therefor and all such regulations shall be deemed to form a part
of these presents which shall be read and construed as if such
regulations had been set out and incorporated herein.
The second:
[I]n construing this lease and the regulations which are expressed to be incorporated herein, the same shall be read and
construed as if all regulations had been set out herein and been
made part and parcel hereof, and in the event of there being
any conflict between the provisions of any regulation and any
provision set out in this lease, other than the covenants on the
part of the lessee for the payment of rents and royalties, the
provisions of the regulations shall prevail.
Obviously these changes in wording created substantive changes in the
effect of the lease contract. The "compliance with laws" provisions not
only stipulated that the lease was subject to applicable laws, but also incorporated as part of the contract the present and future regulations made
under the Provincial Lands Act"0 and the Oil and Gas Wells Act. 9 ' A legal consequence was that future petroleum and natural gas regulations,
even though not applicable retroactively as legislation, would bind the
lessee by contractual force. Now it was true that the terms and provisions
binding under the lease contract could be altered from time to time by the
incorporation by reference into the contract of the unilateral changes in
the regulations made by the lessor. Reading these two provisions
together, however, a court would probably conclude that the exception of
"covenants on the part of the lessee for the payment of rents and royalties" to the stipulation that regulations would prevail over the lease provisions in the event of conflict, gave a protected status to the duties to pay
rent and royalties so that these obligations as stated in the lease would be
immune to change by force of the contract.
In 1948, the provincial grip was tightened." The "compliance with
laws" provisions were divided to deal separately with the regulations
90. 1931 (Alta.) c. 43.
91. Id. at c. 46.
92. A revision and consolidation of the petroleum and natural gas regulations was
established by O.C. 308-48 of March 29, 1948. These regulations were the last issued
as a complete code for the disposal of the Crown's petroleum and natural gas. Thereafter the subject was dealt with in the statute itself, with regulations supplementing the
statutory provisions. See THE MINES AND MINERALS AcT, 1962 (Alta.) c. 49, and in par-

ticular, Part V.
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made under the Provincial Lands Act and those made under the Oil and
Gas Wells Act, and they were expanded to deal with the subject matter
covered by the second "compliance with laws" provision."
The "renewal" provision was bolstered to make clear that the renewal lease
would be granted under the regulations in force at the time of renewal
and that the right of renewal was conditioned on observance by the lessee of the regulations in force not only at the beginning of the lease but
also from time to time during the currency of the lease.
Added for the benefit of the lessee was a provision in the reddendum
clause stipulating that "the maximum royalty payable on the petroleum
during the first term of this lease shall not exceed one-sixth of the gross
recovery from the lands herein described.""4
Alterations of style and clarity have occurred in these Crown lease
clauses since 1948. They appear in the twenty-one-year lease form applicable under the Mines and Minerals Act prior to 1962 as follows:
1. Renewal:
[R]enewable for further terms each of twenty-one years so long
as the location is capable of producing petroleum or natural
gas in commercial quantity, provided the lessee furnishes evidence satisfactory to the Minister to show that during the term
of the lease he has complied fully with the conditions of such
lease and with the provisions of The Mines and Minerals Act
in force from time to time during the currency of the lease.
The lease and any such renewals thereof shall be subject to all
such provisions of The Mines and Minerals Act and the regulations in force from time to time during their currency and each
renewal shall be in accordance with the provisions of the said
Act and the regulations in force at the time of the granting of
such renewal.
2. Royalty:
[A]nd also rendering and paying therefore unto Her Majesty
a royalty on all petroleum and natural gas taken from the said
lands . . . at such rate as is now or may hereafter from time

to time be prescribed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.
. . . The maximum royalty payable on the petroleum during
93. Nevertheless, this second provision was continued in the lease-a typical example of the conservatism of legislative draughtsmen. It was omitted from the lease
form on the next revision.
94. This provision follows § 20(b) (i) of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulations, 1948, O.C. 308-48, March 28, 1948.
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the first term of this lease shall not exceed one-sixth of the
gross recovery from the lands herein described.
3. Compliance with laws:
That the lessee at all times shall perform, observe and comply
with the provisions of The Mines and Minerals Act, and any
regulations that at any time may be made under the authority
of the said Act or any Act or Acts passed in substitution
therefore, and all such provisions and regulations that prescribe,
relate to or affect the rights, obligations, privileges and restrictions of and upon lessees of petroleum and natural gas rights,
the property of the Crown, shall be deemed to be incorporated
into these presents and shall bind the lessee in the same manner
and to the same extent as if the same were set out herein as
covenants on the part of the lessee; provided that each and every
provision, order or regulation hereafter made shall be deemed to
be incorporated into these presents and shall bind the lessee
as and from the date it is made, and in the event of conflict between any order or regulation hereafter made and any order or
regulation previously made the order or regulation last made
shall prevail.
The 1962 revision of the Mines and Minerals Act,9" which introduced a
new ten-year lease in the place of the former twenty-one-year lease, provides for a renewal after the ten-year term "for so long thereafter as this
lease is permitted to continue under and by virtue of the said Act," but
otherwise continues these clauses unchanged.
Position of Crown Grantee in Alberta
The clauses in the Alberta Crown agreements which bind grantees
to changes introduced by statute or regulation are clear and explicit, and
with the case law supporting them, leave little room for argument in support of the original rights vested under the terms of the agreement. However, certain arguments may be advanced to entrench at least some basic
provisions of the agreements.
The first argument involves the interpretation of conveyancing instruments. The contention is that the term of the lease and the maximum
royalty are entrenched provisions because they are stated in the conveying portions of the lease separate from the covenants and conditions of
the lease where the "compliance with laws" provisions appear. Therefore, the "compliance with laws" provisions are to be read as dealing
95. 1962 (Alta.) c. 49.
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only with the subject matter contained in the covenants and conditions,
and not with the grant, habendum and reddendum provisions. Such a
construction, though it violates the rules that the instrument is to be read
as a whole96 and that a grant by the Crown is to be construed most
strongly against the grantee,9 7 peacefully resolves what would otherwise
be a conflict between repugnant provisions-on one hand, the stipulation
of a certain term of years and a maximum royalty, and on the other
hand, the stipulation that the rights of the lessee are subject to variation
from time to time by the incorporation of legislative changes. Therefore,
if, for example, the Alberta Legislature were to amend the Mines and
Minerals Act9" by deleting section 142(1), which provides that the maximum royalty shall not exceed one-sixth, and if a royalty regulation were
then promulgated which exacted a royalty in excess of one-sixth, this
argument would lead to the conclusion that the regulation would not
bind the lessee by force of the lease contract. Any binding force would
have to derive from the legislative character of the regulation, and would
require an express enactment that the regulation was to apply retroactively to leases previously granted. It would then, of course, be confiscatory, with the benefits previously stated accruing to the lessee.99
The second argument is founded on basic considerations of contract
law. No doubt a contracting party may submit the standards of performance of a contract to the subjective discretion of the other contracting party, and, at the most, the court will require the latter to be honestly
satisfied on a reasonable assessment of the situation."' Also, it is permissible to refer the settlement of contract terms to arbitration."' But
there seems to be a strong objection in principle to the proposition that
one contracting party may agree to be bound by such terms as the other
contracting party may from time to time decide. Although such an agreement may be defended on the principle of freedom of contract, to so defend extends the principle to such extreme that the consensual nature of
contract becomes a mockery. While no argument along this line of reasoning was directed to the courts in the cases cited, there has developed in
recent years a doctrine in commercial cases which provides a parallel. It
is a doctrine which recognizes a "core of the contract," so that no exemption clause, however sweeping, can protect a contracting party from
96. 11 HALSBURY (3rd ed.) § 638.
97. Id. at § 642.
98. 1962 (Alta.) c. 49.
99. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
100. Egbert, J. in Hudson's Bay Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Dynamic Petroleums Ltd.
(1958) 26 W.W.R. 504.
101. Calvan Consolidated Oil & Gas Co. v. Manning, [1959] S.C.R. 253, 17 D.L.R.

(2d) 1; see also

LEWIS

& THOMPSON,
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the legal consequences of a fundamental breach by him of its terms.
For example, a clause in an equipment lease stating that "the lessor makes
no representations or warranty (express, implied, statutory or otherwise)
as to any matter whatsoever, including without limitation, the condition
of the equipment, its merchantability or its fitness for any particular
purpose" cannot be relied on to relieve the lessor from the fundamental
obligation of providing equipment that works for a reasonable time.
Therefore, in the case of a five-year lease of a showcase with a motorized selector device, a succession of break-downs in the selector motor
within the first few months entitled the lessee to return the showcase and
to be relieved from the rental obligations of the lease.'0
By analogy, it may be argued that, notwithstanding a clause binding
a party to the contract to comply with such changes as may from time to
time be introduced by the other party, there is a core to the contract which
is unalterable and must be performed. This core of the contract is sometimes reached as a matter of construction of the contract by rejecting as
repugnant any clauses of the contract which would whittle it away.'
In
terms of the Crown lease, the doctrine would require the court to identify
certain fundamental terms of the lease as unalterable by the Crown by
the incorporation of future statutory provisions or regulations. Such
fundamentals might include the duration of the term of the lease, the
right of renewal, the rental and royalty clauses, and the basic rights to
produce and to market the leased substances.
It should be noted, however, that the doctrine has most frequently
been invoked in aid of a party to a so-called "adhesion" contract in order
to grant him a remedy otherwise denied to him by the "fine print" in a
standard contract form.'
An underlying assumption has been that the
inequality of bargaining power in favor of the party proffering the form
justifies a departure from the traditional concept of the binding force of
all the terms of a written contract. This appeal to the protective sentiments of the court would have a hollow ring when made on behalf of oil
companies which have been accepting Crown leases for many years fully
cognizant of the "fine print."
At this point, one may sum up by saying that only arguments of
tenuous analogy can be advanced to undermine the incorporating effect
of the contract as to statutes and regulations which would change funda102.

Canadian-Dominion Leasing Corp. v. Suburban Superdrug Ltd. (1966),

W.W.R. 396 (Alta. C.A.); see

ATIYAH, THE SALE OF GOODs

55

23, 79-81 (2d ed. 1963) ;

see also Knowles v. Anchorage Holdings Co. (1964), 46 W.W.R. 174, 43 D.L.R. (2d)
300 (B.C.); Western Processing & Cold Storage Ltd. v. Hamilton Construction Ltd.
(1965), 51 W.W.R. 354 (Man. C.A.).
103 ATIYAH, op. cit. supra note 102, at 80-81.
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mental terms of the Crown lease. The advantage of discrediting the
binding effect of the Crown's statutes and regulations through contract
when they may be made binding as retroactive legislation destroying
vested rights is, as previously stated, mainly a political one. If the government can answer a charge of confiscation by showing that its action
in shortening a lease term or in increasing a royalty is fully justified by
the lease contract, then this action is more politically feasible than if the
only answer to the charge is that vested rights must be violated in the
public interest."' In addition, there are the legal rules previously mentioned that require retroactive statutes and regulations to be strictly construed and give an implied right to compensation if property rights are
expropriated.
CurrentBritish Columbia, Saskatchewan and Federal Crown Leases
An examination of Crown leases from other Canadian jurisdictions
reveals the British Columbia form to be similar to the Alberta form from
the point of view of permitting changes in. a lease's terms and provisions
so as to be in accord with the public interest. The Saskatchewan and
federal leases favor the grantee in this respect.
The British Columbia lease must be admired for its frankness in
approach. No attempt is made to disguise it as similar to private conveyances. It simply grants Crown petroleum and natural gas subject
to the statutes and regulations in force from time to time. The totality
of the lease clauses follow:
The lessor doth hereby demise unto the lessee, in accordance
with and subject to the provisions of the Petroleum and Natural
Gas Act, all Crown petroleum and natural gas in the location
herein described, and the lessee doth hereby covenant and agree
at all times to perform, observe, and comply with the provisions
of the said Act, and amendments made thereunto from time to
time enacted, and the provisions of any regulations which may
from time to time be made under the authority thereof, and all
such provisions as are from time to time enacted or made shall
be deemed to be incorporated into these presents and shall bind
the lessee in the same manner and to the same extent as if the
same, as they are enacted, made or amended, were set out herein
as covenants on the part of the lessee.
104. Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 TUL. L. REv. 481 (1962).
Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REV.
1178 (1964).
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The lessee shall keep the lessor indemnified against all actions, claims, and demands that may be brought or made against
the lessor by reason of anything done by the lessee, his servants,
workmen, or agents, in the exercise or purported exercise of
the rights, powers, and privileges hereby granted.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the lessor and lessee have
hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above
written.
The Saskatchewan Crown lease employs a phraseology in the "compliance with laws" provision that suggests a result totally different from
that of the Alberta provisions. The Saskatchewan clause reads:
The lessee shall at all times fulfill, perform, observe and comply
with all the provisions of The Mineral Resources Act, 1959,
The Oil and Gas Conservation Act, and any regulations thereunder that are applicable or that may be by future enactment
or amendment in any manner whatsoever applicable to his
operations, plant, works, business or undertaking, and other
statute or regulation that may be, by future enactment or
amendment in any manner whatsoever, applicable to such operations, plant, works, business or undertaking.
This clause seems to require the lessee to comply only with those
statutory provisions and regulations, present and future, which are "applicable to his operations, plant, works, business or undertaking." A
strict construction would require the statutory provision or regulation to
be applicable by its own force as legislation operating retroactively.
Therefore, the clause would add no obligation to which the lessee would
not be subject in any event. Further, the enumeration of "operations,
plant, works, business or undertaking" would limit the clause so that
the fundamental matters of duration of term of the lease, renewal, rents,
and royalties would be outside its scope.
Like the Saskatchewan Crown lease, the federal lease under the
Canada Oil and Gas Land Regulations"'6 bears a construction more favorable to the lessee. Its "compliance with laws" provisions are:
105. If the conversion of leases and renewals under the 1962 Alberta Mines and
Minerals Act to ten-year terms from twenty-one-year terms had been opposed by the
petroleum industry rather than supported by it, then the industry's opposition could have
been met by the answer that the change in no way prejudiced vested rights, and this
answer would have been technically correct if the operation of the "compliance with
laws" provisions of the leases were not limited to exclude such a fundamental term of
the lease as its duration.
106. P.C. 1963-408.
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5. The lessee will comply with the Canada Oil and Gas Land
Regulations.
6. The lessee will comply with the provisions of any statute
and regulation made thereunder with respect to the exploration for, the drilling, production, storage, processing and
transportation of oil and gas and all such provisions as are
from time to time enacted or made shall be deemed to be
incorporated in this oil and gas lease and shall bind the lessee
in the same manner and to the same extent as if the same,
as they are enacted, made or amended, were set out herein
as covenants on the part of the lessee without prejudice to
any rights of the lessee under the Canada Oil and Gas Land
Regulations.
The Canada Oil and Gas Land Regulations are defined in clause 12 of the
lease to mean the regulations in force at the date of the lease and any
order made thereunder. Being limited to the existing regulations, the
effect of clause 5 is not so far-reaching as the Alberta counterpart.
Clause 6 uses language which incorporates future statutory provisions
and regulations into the lease, but these are limited to those dealing with
"exploration for, the drilling, production, storage, processing and transportation of oil and gas," and therefore, the clause does not affect the
fundamental terms of the lease.
EFFECTIVENESS OF MECHANISM IN ALBERTA

Considering the widespread attempts to wrest sovereignty over petroleum resources from the containment of concession agreements made
in the past, it is remarkable that there should have developed in Canada
a mechanism which frees oil agreements from fetters. That this mechanism has in fact permitted changes as the public interest required can
readily be shown.
First, in 1930 when provincial administrations in western Canada
gained control over their natural resources from the federal regime in
a political struggle which some have likened to. the emergence of new nations from colonial rule,1" 7 the new provincial administrators found in the
variable royalty clause a means to remedy what they considered to be a
"give-away" of resources by the federal regime. Their efforts to increase
royalties and fees gained only partial success, but at least the contest resolved itself peacefully in the courts."0 ' Once again in 1936, at a time of
107.
(1911).
108.

BRAMLEY-MOORE,

See note 76

CANADA AND HER COLONIES, OR, HOME RULE FOR ALBERTA

supra and

accompanying text.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1967

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 [1967], Art. 5
CANADIAN PETROLEUM LEGISLATION
political change in Alberta (then the only province producing oil), the
variable royalty clause enabled a new government to exact a higher royalty schedule."'
In fact, the variable royalty clause could not be tolerated by the
oil industry were its powers to be exercised with every wind of political
change. Rather, in a period of long political stability in the western
provinces, an accommodation has been reached between the governments
and the oil industry which provides stable royalty rates while recognizing
the need for periodic revisions. In Alberta, the government, through the
Premier of the province, has given a verbal commitment to the oil industry that it will review and, if desirable, change the royalty schedule only
every ten years. Faithful to this agreement, the government made
changes in 1952 and 1962, this last variation producing a sharply augmented royalty scale as the rate of production increases. 10
This mechanism for legislation by contract has also enabled government policy to respond rapidly to changes in the environment of the oil
industry. By 1961 it had become generally recognized in the industry
that, despite the millions of acres of Crown petroleum lands under control
of the Alberta government, a "tight" land position had developed in the
province. This situation was blamed on the long twenty-one-year terms
of Crown leases, and on the provisions for renewal of all the acreage under a lease if the lessee gained production anywhere on the leased lands.
Further, a one-dollar-per-acre-lease rental was an insufficient spur to
joint venture arrangements which would lessen the concentration of large
holdings among a few major oil companies.
Because of the legislation by contract mechanism, the government
was able to revise the Mines and Minerals Act". in 1962, so as to accomplish basic changes not only with respect to new agreements but also with
respect to existing ones. Not a single complaint was raised in the name
of vested rights. Thus, the primary term of new Crown leases and of
renewals of existing leases was changed to ten years instead of twentyone years. At the expiration of the ten years, instead of the former
twenty-one-year renewal of all the lands, the term would be continued
as to the producing and unitized acreage only under a "thereafter" clause
109. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
110. The last revision was made under O.C. 256/62 of February 21, 1962.
vided an upgraded schedule as follows:

It pro-

Monthly Production
Crown Royalty
0- 750 barrels ..............................................
8% of total
750-2700 barrels .............. 60 barrels plus 20% of output over 750 barrels
2700 barrels and over ......................................
16 2/3% of total
111. 1962 (Alta.) c. 49.
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similar to those found in freehold oil and gas leases. The existing leases
were affected not only as to renewals. Formerly, the one-year drilling
commitments contained in the leases were not enforced. Now, the
changes included a schedule whereby these drilling commitments would
be enforced over a period of five years, beginning with the oldest leases,
so that in 1967 and thereafter, the existing twenty-one-year leases would
be brought to an end after ten years if the lessee had not drilled and
gained production or unitized his lease." 2
CONCLUSION

It was said earlier in this paper that the worth of the legal mechanism for submitting oil agreements to the dictates of the public interest
must be measured in terms of the willingness of foreign investors to participate in the petroleum industy on conditions acceptable to an informed
and responsible government."'
The record of investor confidence in the petroleum industry in western Canada speaks for itself."' Whether the terms and conditions of oil
agreements have been in the public interest can best be measured by the
popular support enjoyed by the governments responsible for setting
them. By this test, again the record in western Canada speaks affirmatively." 5' It is submitted that these long records of investor and public
confidence in the management of the petroleum resources owe no. small
measure of indebtedness to the fact that lawyers have been able to devise
a legal mechanism that has forestalled the straitjacketing of public
policy by oil agreements. The absence of adequate legal mechanisms for
accommodating change exaggerates the need for change, and leads to
immoderation in demands. Public administrators, aware that they have
112. REPORT OF ALBERTA OIL AND GAS LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, 1962. The
writer was a member of the committee. The preamble to the recommendations of the
committee read as follows:
It is the opinion of your committee that the present system of tenure and
Crown reserves tends to curtail primary exploration by the greatly increased
number of companies anxious to participate in the discovery and development
of oil and gas resources in the Province.
The system recently seems to have definitely contributed to the spending
of money in drilling of development wells in marginal areas instead of in primary exploration in the locating of new oil and gas fields. Your committee's
recommendations are largely aimed at a system which will permit a more rapid
turn-over of undrilled acreage so as to encourage more primary exploration
and the discovery of new oil and gas reserves.
113. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., HANSEN, DYNAMIc DECADE (1958).
115. The governments of Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan have enjoyed unprecedented popular support. In Alberta, the Social Credit government has
been in power since 1935. In British Columbia, the Social Credit government took office
in 1951. Saskatchewan had a socialist party, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in power from 1944 to 1964, when a Liberal government took office.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1967

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 [1967], Art. 5
CANADIAN PETROLEUM LEGISLATION

319

the power to introduce and implement new policies, are the more prone
to be cautious and responsible to change.
In terms of sovereignty over resources, it must be admitted that
critics of the Canadian record make their case when measured by the
percentage of petroleum development controlled by foreigners."'
But
their case is oversimplified for it ignores a significant aspect of sovereignty. In a federal state so widespread geographically as Canada and
so diverse in its economic regions, the urge for sovereignty manifests
itself not only at a national level. Indeed, in western Canada the provincial regimes historically have directed their aspirations for economic
independence against the federal government in Ottawa. Today, a usual
posture of provincial governments is opposition to nationalistic federal
policies which would impede the flow of investment, whether domestic
or foreign, into resource development." 7 The truth about sovereignty
over resource development in Canada is that there is yet no national consensus that would place the case for restraints on foreign investment
upon a higher plane than the case for rapid development of resources.
At the very least, however, it may be claimed for this legal mechanism that it permits the exercise of sovereignty over natural resources.
The extent to which this sovereignty will be exercised depends on the
political will of the time and place.
116. See note 9 supra.
117. For example, the government of Alberta opposes the recent decision of the
federal government to refuse a permit to Trans Canada Pipe Lines to construct a major
gas pipeline which would pass through the United States on its way from the western
gas fields to eastern Canadian markets. The federal position is that such an important
carrier should not be placed under foreign control even for part of its journey. The
provincial position is that the natural gas industry should be encouraged to develop under
the most favorable economic conditions.
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